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Abstract—Observational equivalence allows us to study im-
portant security properties such as anonymity. Unfortunately,
the difficulty of proving observational equivalence hinders
analysis. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet simplify its proof by
introducing a sufficient condition for observational equiva-
lence, called diff-equivalence, which is a reachability condition
that can be proved automatically by ProVerif. However, diff-
equivalence is a very strong condition, which often does not
hold even if observational equivalence does. In particular, when
proving equivalence between processes that contain several
parallel components, e.g., P | Q and P ′ | Q′, diff-equivalence
requires that P is equivalent to P ′ and Q is equivalent to Q′.
To relax this constraint, Delaune, Ryan & Smyth introduced
the idea of swapping data between parallel processes P ′ and Q′
at synchronisation points, without proving its soundness. We
extend their work by formalising the semantics of synchro-
nisation, formalising the definition of swapping, and proving
its soundness. We also relax some restrictions they had on the
processes to which swapping can be applied. Moreover, we have
implemented our results in ProVerif. Hence, we extend the class
of equivalences that can be proved automatically. We showcase
our results by analysing privacy in election schemes by Fujioka,
Okamoto & Ohta and Lee et al., and in the vehicular ad-hoc
network by Freudiger et al.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are required to satisfy a plethora
of security requirements. These requirements include clas-
sical properties such as secrecy and authentication, and
emerging properties including anonymity [1], [2], [3], ideal
functionality [4], [5], [6], and stronger notions of secrecy [7],
[8], [9]. These security requirements can generally be
classified as indistinguishability or reachability properties.
Reachability properties express requirements of a protocol’s
reachable states. For example, secrecy can be expressed
as the inability of deriving a particular value from any
possible protocol execution. By comparison, indistinguisha-
bility properties express requirements of a protocol’s ob-
servable behaviour. Intuitively, two protocols are said to
be indistinguishable if an observer has no way of telling
them apart. Indistinguishability enables the formulation of
more complex properties. For example, anonymity can be
expressed as the inability to distinguish between an instance
of the protocol in which actions are performed by a user,
from another instance in which actions are performed by
another user.
Indistinguishability can be formalised as observational
equivalence, denoted ≈. As a motivating example, consider
an election scheme, in which a voter A voting v is formalised
by a process V (A, v). Ballot secrecy can be formalised by
the equivalence
V (A, v) | V (B, v′) ≈ V (A, v′) | V (B, v) (1)
which means that no adversary can distinguish when two
voters swap their votes [2]. (We use the applied pi cal-
culus syntax and terminology [5], which we introduce in
Section II.)
A. Approaches to proving equivalences
Observational equivalence is the tool introduced for rea-
soning about security requirements of cryptographic pro-
tocols in the spi calculus [4] and in the applied pi calcu-
lus [5]. It was originally proved manually, using the notion
of labelled bisimilarity [5], [10], [11] to avoid universal
quantification over adversaries.
Manual proofs of equivalence are long and difficult,
so automating these proofs is desirable. Automation often
relies on symbolic semantics [12], [13] to avoid the infinite
branching due to messages sent by the adversary by treating
these messages as variables. For a bounded number of
sessions, several decision procedures have been proposed
for processes without else branches, first for a fixed set of
primitives [14], [15], then for a wide variety of primitives
with the restriction that processes are determinate, that
is, their execution is entirely determined by the adversary
inputs [16]. These decision procedures are too complex for
useful implementations. Practical algorithms have since been
proposed and implemented: SPEC [17] for fixed primitives
and without else branches, APTE [18] for fixed primitives
with else branches and non-determinism, and AKISS [19],
[20] for a wide variety of primitives and determinate pro-
cesses.
For an unbounded number of sessions, proving equiva-
lence is an undecidable problem [14], [21], so automated
proof techniques are incomplete. ProVerif automatically
proves an equivalence notion, named diff-equivalence, be-
tween processes P and Q that share the same structure and
differ only in the choice of terms [22]. Diff-equivalence
requires that the two processes always reduce in the same
way, in the presence of any adversary. In particular, the
two processes must have the same branching behaviour.
Hence, diff-equivalence is much stronger than observational
equivalence. Maude-NPA [23] and Tamarin [24] also use
that notion, and Baudet [25] showed that diff-equivalence is
decidable for a bounded number of sessions and used this
technique for proving resistance against off-line guessing
attacks [26]. Decision procedures also exist for restricted
classes of protocols: for an unbounded number of sessions,
trace equivalence has a decision procedure for symmetric-
key, type-compliant, acyclic protocols [27], which is too
complex for useful implementation, and for ping-pong pro-
tocols [28], which is implemented in a tool.
B. Diff-equivalence and its limitations
The main approach to automate proofs of observational
equivalence with an unbounded number of sessions is to
use diff-equivalence. (In our motivating example (1), a
bounded number of sessions is sufficient, but an unbounded
number becomes useful in more complex examples, as in
Section IV-B.) Diff-equivalence seems well-suited to our
motivating example, since the processes V (A, v) | V (B, v′)
and V (A, v′) | V (B, v) differ only by their terms. Such a
pair of processes can be represented as a biprocess which
has the same structure as each of the processes and captures
the differences in terms using the construct diff[M,M ′],
denoting the occurrence of a term M in the first process
and a term M ′ in the second. For example, the pair of
processes in our motivating example can be represented as
the biprocess P1 , V (A, diff[v, v′]) | V (B, diff[v′, v]). The
two processes represented by a biprocess P are recovered
by fst(P ) and snd(P ). Hence, fst(P1) = V (A, v) | V (B, v′)
and snd(P1) = V (A, v′) | V (B, v).
Diff-equivalence implies observational equivalence.
Hence, the equivalence (1) can be inferred from the diff-
equivalence of the biprocess P1. However, diff-equivalence
is so strong that it does not hold for biprocesses modelling
even trivial schemes, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Consider an election scheme that instructs
voters to publish their vote on an anonymous channel.
The voter’s role can be formalised as V (A, v) = c〈v〉.
Thus, ballot secrecy can be analysed using the biprocess
P , c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v]〉. It is trivial to see
that fst(P ) = c〈v〉 | c〈v′〉 is indistinguishable from
snd(P ) = c〈v′〉 | c〈v〉, because any output by fst(P )
can be matched by an output from snd(P ), and vice-
versa. However, the biprocess P does not satisfy diff-
equivalence. Intuitively, this is because diff-equivalence
requires that the subprocesses of the parallel composition,
namely, c〈diff[v, v′]〉 and c〈diff[v′, v]〉, each satisfy diff-
equivalence, which is false, because c〈v〉 is not equivalent
to c〈v′〉 (nor is c〈v′〉 equivalent to c〈v〉).
Overcoming the difficulty encountered in Example 1 is
straightforward: using the general property that P | Q ≈
Q | P , we can instead prove
V (A, v) | V (B, v′) ≈ V (B, v) | V (A, v′)
which, in the case of Example 1, is proved by noticing that
the two sides of the equivalence are equal, i.e., by noticing
that the biprocess P̂ , c〈diff[v, v]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v′]〉 trivially
satisfies diff-equivalence, since fst(P̂ ) = snd(P̂ ). However,
this technique cannot be applied to more complex examples,
as we show below.
Some security properties (e.g., privacy in elections [2],
[29], vehicular ad-hoc networks [3], [30], and anonymity
networks [1], [31], [32]) can only be realised if processes
synchronise their actions in a specific manner.
Example 2. Building upon Example 1, suppose each voter
sends their identity, then their vote, both on an anonymous
channel, i.e., V (A, v) = c〈A〉.c〈v〉. This example does
not satisfy ballot secrecy, because V (A, v) | V (B, v′)
can output A, v, B, v′ on channel c in that order, while
V (A, v′) | V (B, v) cannot.
To modify this example so that it satisfies ballot secrecy, we
use the notion of barrier synchronisation, which ensures that
a process will block, when a barrier is encountered, until all
other processes executing in parallel reach this barrier [33],
[34], [35], [36].
Example 3. Let us modify the previous example so that
voters publish their identity, synchronise with other voters,
and publish their vote on an anonymous channel. The
voter’s role can be formalised as process V (A, v) =
c〈A〉.1:: c〈v〉, where 1:: is a barrier synchronisation. Bal-
lot secrecy can then be analysed using biprocess Pex ,
c〈A〉.1:: c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈diff[v′, v]〉. Synchroni-
sation ensures the output of A and B, prior to v and v′,
in both fst(Pex) and snd(Pex), so that ballot secrecy holds,
but diff-equivalence does not hold.
The technique used to overcome the difficulty in Ex-
ample 1 cannot be applied here, because swapping the
two voting processes leads to the biprocess P ′ex ,
c〈diff[A,B]〉.1:: c〈v〉 | c〈diff[B,A]〉.1:: c〈v′〉, which does
not satisfy diff-equivalence. Intuitively, we need to swap
at the barrier, not at the beginning (cf. P ′ex). In essence,
by swapping data between the two voting processes at
the barrier, it suffices to prove that the biprocess P ′′ex ,
c〈A〉.1:: c〈diff[v, v]〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈diff[v′, v′]〉 satisfies diff-
equivalence, which trivially holds since fst(P ′′ex) = snd(P
′′
ex).
As illustrated in Examples 1 & 3, diff-equivalence is a
sufficient condition for observational equivalence, but it is
not necessary, and this precludes the analysis of interesting
security properties. In this paper, we will partly overcome
this limitation: we weaken the diff-equivalence requirement
by allowing swapping of data between processes at barriers.
C. Contributions
First, we extend the process calculus by Blanchet, Abadi
& Fournet [22] to capture barriers (Section II). Secondly,
we formally define a compiler that encodes barriers and
swapping using private channel communication (Section III).
As a by-product, if we compile without swapping, we also
obtain an encoding of barriers into the calculus without
barriers, via private channel communication. Thirdly, we
provide a detailed soundness proof for this compiler. (Details
of the proof are in the long version of this paper [37].)
Fourthly, we have implemented our compiler in ProVerif.
Hence, we extend the class of equivalences that can be
proved automatically. Finally, we analyse privacy in election
schemes and in a vehicular ad-hoc network to showcase our
results (Section IV).
D. Comparison with Delaune, Ryan & Smyth
The idea of swapping data at barriers was informally
introduced by Delaune, Ryan & Smyth [38], [39]. Our
contributions improve upon their work by providing a strong
theoretical foundation to their idea. In particular, they do not
provide a soundness proof, we do; they prohibit replication
and place restrictions on control flow and parallel composi-
tion, we relax these conditions; and they did not implement
their results, we implement ours. (Smyth presented a prelim-
inary version of our compiler in his thesis [40, Chapter 5],
and Klus, Smyth & Ryan implemented that compiler [41].)
II. PROCESS CALCULUS
We recall Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet’s dialect [22] of the
applied pi calculus [5], [42]. This dialect is particularly use-
ful due to the automated support provided by ProVerif [43].
The semantics of the applied pi calculus [5] and the dialect
of [22] were defined using structural equivalence. Those
semantics have been simplified by semantics with config-
urations and without structural equivalence, first for trace
properties [44], then for equivalences [25], [45], [46]. In this
paper, we use the latter semantics. In addition, we extend
the calculus to capture barrier synchronisation, by giving the
syntax and formal semantics of barriers.
A. Syntax and semantics
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, an infi-
nite set of variables, and a finite set of function symbols
(constructors and destructors), each with an associated arity.
We write f for a constructor, g for a destructor, and h for
a constructor or destructor; constructors are used to build
terms, whereas destructors are used to manipulate terms in
expressions. Thus, terms range over names, variables, and
applications of constructors to terms, and expressions allow
applications of function symbols to expressions (Fig. 1). We
use metavariables u and w to range over both names and
variables. Substitutions {M/x} replace x with M . Arbitrarily
large substitutions can be written as {M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn}
M,N ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) constructor application
D ::= expressions
M term
h(D1, . . . , Dl) function evaluation
P,Q,R ::= processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν a.P name restriction
M(x).P message input
M〈N〉.P message output
let x = D in P else Q expression evaluation
t::P barrier
Figure 1. Syntax for terms and processes
and the letters σ and τ range over substitutions. We write
Mσ for the result of applying σ to the variables of M .
Similarly, renamings {u/w} replace w with u, where u and
w are both names or both variables.
The semantics of a destructor g of arity l are given by
a finite set def(g) of rewrite rules g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l ) → M ′,
where M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l ,M
′ are terms that contain only construc-
tors and variables, the variables of M ′ must be bound in
M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l , and variables are subject to renaming. The
evaluation of expression g(M1, . . . ,Ml) succeeds if there
exists a rewrite rule g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l )→M ′ in def(g) and a
substitution σ such that Mi = M ′iσ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l},
and in this case g(M1, . . . ,Ml) evaluates to M ′σ. In order
to avoid distinguishing constructors and destructors in the
semantics of expressions, we let def(f) be {f(x1, . . . , xl)→
f(x1, . . . , xl)}, where f is a constructor of arity l. In particu-
lar, we use n-ary constructors (M1, . . . ,Mn) for tuples, and
unary destructors πi,n for projections, with the rewrite rule
πi,n((x1, . . . , xn)) → xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. ProVerif
supports both rewrite rules and equations [22]; we omit
equations in this paper for simplicity. It is straightforward
to extend our proofs to equations, and our implementation
supports them.
The grammar for processes is presented in Fig. 1. The
process let x = D in P else Q tries to evaluate D; if this
succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed,
otherwise, Q is executed. We define the conditional if M =
N then P else Q as let x = eq(M,N) in P else Q, where
x is a fresh variable, eq is a binary destructor, and def(eq) =
{eq(y, y)→ y}; we always include eq in our set of function
symbols. The else branches may be omitted when Q is the
null process. The rest of the syntax is standard (see [8], [22],
[45]), except for barriers, which we explain below.
Our syntax allows processes to contain barriers t::P ,
where t ∈ N. Intuitively, t::P blocks P until all processes
running in parallel are ready to synchronise at barrier t.
In addition, barriers are ordered, so t::P is also blocked
if there are any barriers t′ such that t′ < t. Blanchet,
Abadi & Fournet [22, Section 8] also introduced a notion
of synchronisation, named stages. A stage synchronisation
can occur at any point, by dropping processes that did
not complete the previous stage. By comparison, a barrier
synchronisation cannot drop processes. For example, in the
process c〈k〉.1:: c〈m〉 | 1:: c〈n〉, the barrier synchronisation
cannot occur before the output of k. It follows that the
process cannot output n without having previously output
k. In contrast, with stage synchronisation, either k is output
first, then the process moves to the next stage, then it
may output m and n, or the process immediately moves
to the next stage by dropping c〈k〉.1:: c〈m〉, so it may
output n without any other output. Our notion of barrier
is essential for equivalence properties that require swapping
data between two processes, because we must not drop one
of these processes.
Given a process P , the multiset barriers(P ) collects all
barriers that occur in P . Thus, barriers(t::Q) = {t} ∪
barriers(Q) and in all other cases, barriers(P ) is the multiset
union of the barriers of the immediate subprocesses of P .
We naturally extend the function barriers to multisets P of
processes by barriers(P) =
⋃
P∈P barriers(P ). For each
barrier t, the number of processes that must synchronise
is equal to the number of elements t in barriers(P ). It
follows that the number of barriers which must be reached
is defined in advance of execution, and thus branching
behaviour may cause blocking. For example, the process
c(x).if x = k then 1:: c〈m〉 else c〈n〉 | 1:: c〈s〉 contains
two barriers that must synchronise. However, when the term
bound to x is not k, the else branch is taken and one of
the barriers is dropped, so only one barrier remains. In
this case, barrier synchronisation blocks forever, and the
process never outputs s. The occurrence of barriers under
replication is explicitly forbidden, because with barriers
under replication, the number of barriers that we need to
synchronise is ill-defined. We partly overcome this limitation
in Section III-E1.
The scope of names and variables is delimited by binders
ν n, M(x), and let x = D in. The set of free names
fn(P ) contains every name n in P which is not under the
scope of the binder ν n. The set of free variables fv(P )
contains every variable x in P which is not under the
scope of a message input M(x) or an expression evaluation
let x = D in. Using similar notation, the set of names in a
term M is denoted fn(M) and the set of variables in a term
M is denoted fv(M). We naturally extend these functions
to multisets P of processes by fn(P) =
⋃
P∈P fn(P ) and
fv(P) =
⋃
P∈P fv(P ). A term M is ground if fv(M) = ∅,
a substitution {M/x} is ground if M is ground, and a
M ⇓M (M is a term, so it does not contain destructors)
h(D1, . . . , Dl) ⇓ Nσ if
there exist h(N1, . . . , Nl)→ N ∈ def(h) and σ such that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have Di ⇓Mi and Mi = Niσ
B,E,P ∪ {0} → B,E,P (RED NIL)
B,E,P ∪ {P | Q} → B,E,P ∪ {P,Q} (RED PAR)
B,E,P ∪ {!P} → B,E,P ∪ {P, !P} (RED REPL)
B,E,P ∪ {ν n.P} → B,E ∪ {n′},P ∪ {P{n′/n}}
for some name n′ such that n′ 6∈ E ∪ fn(P ∪ {ν n.P})
(RED RES)
B,E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q} →
B,E,P ∪ {P,Q{M/x}}
(RED I/O)
B,E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} →
B,E,P ∪ {P{M/x}}
if D ⇓M
(RED DESTR 1)
B,E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B,E,P ∪ {Q}
if there is no M such that D ⇓M
(RED DESTR 2)
B,E,P ∪ {t::P1, . . . , t::Pn} →
B\{tn}, E,P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pn}
if n ≥ 1 and for all t′ such that t′ ≤ t, we have
t′ 6∈ B\{tn}, where tn denotes n copies of t.
(RED BAR)
Figure 2. Operational semantics
process P is closed if fv(P ) = ∅. Processes are considered
equal modulo renaming of bound names and variables. As
usual, substitutions avoid name and variable capture, by first
renaming bound names and variables to fresh names and
variables, respectively.
The operational semantics is defined by reduction (→) on
configurations. A configuration C is a triple B,E,P , where
B is a finite multiset of integers, E is a finite set of names,
and P is a finite multiset of closed processes. The multiset
B contains the barriers that control the synchronisation of
processes in P . The set E is initially empty and is extended
to include any names introduced during reduction, namely,
those names introduced by (RED RES). When E = {ã}
and P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, the configuration B,E,P intuitively
stands for ν ã.(P1 | · · · | Pn). We consider configurations as
equal modulo any renaming of the names in E,P that leaves
fn(P) \E unchanged. The initial configuration for a closed
process P is Cinit(P ) = barriers(P ), ∅, {P}. Fig. 2 defines
reduction rules for each construct of the language. The rule
(RED REPL) creates a new copy of the replicated process
P . The rule (RED RES) reduces ν n by creating a fresh
name n′, adding it to E, and substituting it for n. The rule
(RED I/O) performs communication: the term M sent by
N〈M〉.P is received by N(x).Q, and substituted for x. The
rules (RED DESTR 1) and (RED DESTR 2) treat expression
evaluations. They first evaluate D, using the relation D ⇓M ,
which means that the expression D evaluates to the term
M , and is also defined in Fig. 2. When this evaluation
succeeds, (RED DESTR 1) substitutes the result M for x
and runs P . When it fails, (RED DESTR 2) runs Q. Finally,
the new rule (RED BAR) performs barrier synchronisation: it
synchronises on the lowest barrier t in B. If t occurs n times
in B, it requires n processes t::P1, . . . , t::Pn to be ready to
synchronise, and in this case, it removes barrier t both from
B and from these processes, which can then further reduce.
A configuration B,E,P is valid when barriers(P) ⊆ B. It
is easy to check that the initial configuration is valid and that
validity is preserved by reduction. We shall only manipulate
valid configurations.
Example 4. Let us consider the parallel composition of
processes P , c〈k〉.1:: c(x), Q , ν n.1:: c〈n〉, and
R , c(x), which yields the initial configuration C =
{12}, ∅, {P | Q | R}, since the process P | Q | R
contains two barriers 1. We have
C = {12}, ∅, {P | Q | R}
−→ {12}, ∅, {P, Q | R} by (RED PAR)
−→ {12}, ∅, {P, Q, R} by (RED PAR)
−→ {12}, ∅, {1:: c(x), Q, 0} by (RED I/O)
−→ {12}, ∅, {1:: c(x), Q} by (RED NIL)
−→ {12}, {n′}, {1:: c(x), 1:: c〈n′〉} by (RED RES)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {c(x), c〈n′〉} by (RED BAR)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {0, 0} by (RED I/O)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {0} by (RED NIL)
−→ ∅, {n′}, ∅ by (RED NIL)
B. Observational equivalence
Intuitively, configurations C and C′ are observationally
equivalent if they can output on the same channels in the
presence of any adversary. Formally, we adapt the definition
of observational equivalence by Arapinis et al. [46] to
consider barriers rather than mutable state. We define a
context C[ ] to be a process with a hole. We obtain C[P ]
as the result of filling C[ ]’s hole with process P . We
define adversarial contexts as contexts ν ñ.( | Q) with
fv(Q) = ∅ and barriers(Q) = ∅. When C = B,E,P and
C[ ] = ν ñ.( | Q) is an adversarial context, we define
C[C] = B,E ∪ {ñ},P ∪ {Q}, after renaming the names in
E,P so that E ∩ fn(Q) = ∅. A configuration C = B,E,P
can output on a channel N , denoted, C ↓N , if there exists
N〈M〉.P ∈ P with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅, for some term M and
process P .
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence). Observational
equivalence between configurations ≈ is the largest sym-
metric relation R between valid configurations such that
C R C′ implies:
1) if C ↓N , then C′ −→∗↓N , for all N ;
2) if C → C1, then C′ →∗ C′1 and C1 R C′1, for some C′1.
3) C[C] R C[C′] for all adversarial contexts C[ ].
Closed processes P and P ′ are observationally equivalent,
denoted P ≈ P ′, if Cinit(P ) ≈ Cinit(P ′).
The definition first formulates observational equivalence
on semantic configurations. Item 1 guarantees that, if a
configuration C outputs on a public channel, then so does
C′. Item 2 guarantees that this property is preserved by
reduction, and Item 3 guarantees that it is preserved in the
presence of any adversary. Finally, observational equivalence
is formulated on closed processes.
C. Biprocesses
The calculus defines syntax to model pairs of processes
that have the same structure and differ only by the terms that
they contain. We call such a pair of processes a biprocess.
The grammar for biprocesses is an extension of Fig. 1, with
additional cases so that diff[M,M ′] is a term and diff[D,D′]
is an expression. (We occasionally refer to processes and
biprocesses as processes when it is clear from the context.)
Given a biprocess P , we define processes fst(P ) and snd(P )
as follows: fst(P ) is obtained by replacing all occurrences
of diff[M,M ′] with M and snd(P ) is obtained by replacing
diff[M,M ′] with M ′. We define fst(D), fst(M), snd(D),
and snd(M) similarly, and naturally extend these functions
to multisets of biprocesses by fst(P) = {fst(P ) | P ∈ P}
and snd(P) = {snd(P ) | P ∈ P}, and to configura-
tions by fst(B,E,P) = B,E, fst(P) and snd(B,E,P) =
B,E, snd(P). The standard definitions of barriers, free
names, and free variables apply to biprocesses as well.
Observational equivalence can be formalised as a property
of biprocesses:
Definition 2. A closed biprocess P satisfies observational
equivalence if fst(P ) ≈ snd(P ).
The semantics for biprocesses includes the rules in
Fig. 2, except for (RED I/O), (RED DESTR 1), and
(RED DESTR 2) which are revised in Fig. 3. It follows from
this semantics that, if C −→ C′, then fst(C) −→ fst(C′) and
snd(C) −→ snd(C′). In other words, a biprocess reduces
when the two underlying processes reduce in the same way.
However, reductions in fst(C) or snd(C) do not necessarily
imply reductions in C, that is, there exist configurations C
such that fst(C) −→ fst(C′), but there is no such reduction
C −→ C′, and symmetrically for snd(C). For example, given
the configuration C = ∅, ∅, {diff[a, c]〈n〉.0, a(x).0}, we have
fst(C) −→ ∅, ∅, {0, 0}, but there is no reduction C −→
B,E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N ′(x).Q} →
B,E,P ∪ {P,Q{M/x}}
if fst(N) = fst(N ′) and snd(N) = snd(N ′)
(RED I/O)
B,E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} →
B,E,P ∪ {P{diff[M,M ′]/x}}
if fst(D) ⇓M and snd(D) ⇓M ′
(RED DESTR 1)
B,E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B,E,P ∪ {Q}
if there is no M such that fst(D) ⇓M
and no M ′ such that snd(D) ⇓M ′
(RED DESTR 2)
Figure 3. Generalised semantics for biprocesses
B,E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N ′(x).Q} ↑
if (fst(N) = fst(N ′)) 6⇔ (snd(N) = snd(N ′))
(DIV I/O)
B,E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} ↑
if (∃M.fst(D) ⇓M) 6⇔ (∃M ′.snd(D) ⇓M ′)
(DIV DESTR)
Figure 4. Semantics for divergence
∅, ∅, {0, 0}. Formally, this behaviour can be captured using
the divergence relation (↑) for configurations (Fig. 4) [25].
Divergence can occur because either: i) one process can
perform a communication and the other cannot, by rule
(DIV I/O); or ii) the evaluation of an expression succeeds in
one process and fails in the other, by rule (DIV DESTR). Us-
ing the notion of diff-equivalence (Definition 3), Theorem 1
shows that a biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence
when reductions in C[Cinit(fst(P ))] or C[Cinit(snd(P ))] im-
ply reductions in C[Cinit(P )] for all adversarial contexts
C[ ], that is, configurations obtained from C[Cinit(P )] never
diverge.
Definition 3 (Diff-equivalence). A closed biprocess P sat-
isfies diff-equivalence if for all adversarial contexts C[ ],
there is no configuration C such that C[Cinit(P )] −→∗ C
and C ↑.
Theorem 1. Let P be a closed biprocess without barriers. If
P satisfies diff-equivalence, then P satisfies observational
equivalence.
Theorem 1 can be proved by adapting the proof of Blanchet,
Abadi & Fournet [22, Theorem 1], which presents a similar
result using a semantics based on structural equivalence and
reduction instead of reduction on configurations.
III. AUTOMATED REASONING
To prove equivalence, we define a compiler from a bipro-
cess (containing barriers) to a set of biprocesses without
barriers. The biprocesses in that set permit various swapping
strategies. We show that if one of these biprocesses satisfies
diff-equivalence, then the original biprocess satisfies obser-
vational equivalence. The compiler works in two steps:
1) Function annotate annotates barriers with the data to
be swapped and channels for sending and receiving
such data.
2) Function elim-and-swap translates the biprocess with
annotated barriers into biprocesses without barriers,
which encode barriers using communication (inputs
and outputs). We exploit this communication to allow
swapping, by sending back data to a different barrier.
We introduce annotated barriers (Section III-A) and de-
fine these two steps (Sections III-B and III-C) below. By
combining these two steps we obtain our compiler (Sec-
tion III-D), which we have implemented in ProVerif 1.94
(http://proverif.inria.fr/). The proof of soundness shows that
these two steps preserve the observational behaviour of
the biprocesses, so that if a compiled biprocess satisfies
observational equivalence, then so does the initial biprocess.
A. Process calculus with annotated barriers
We introduce an annotated barrier construct t[a, c, ς]::P ,
which is not present in the syntax introduced in Section II,
but is used by our compiler. In this construct, a and c are
distinct channel names: channel a will be used for sending
swappable data, and channel c for receiving swapped data.
Moreover, the ordered substitution ς = (M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn)
collects swappable data M1, . . . ,Mn and associates these
terms with variables x1, . . . , xn; the process P uses these
variables instead of the terms M1, . . . ,Mn. The ordered
substitution ς is similar to a substitution, except that the
elements M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn are ordered. (We indicate or-
dering using parentheses instead of braces.) The ordering is
used to designate each variable in the domain unambigu-
ously. We define dom(ς) = {x1, . . . , xn} and range(ς) =
{M1, . . . ,Mn}. The annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::P binds the
variables in the domain of ς in P , so we extend the functions
fn and fv to annotated barriers as follows:
fn(t[a, c, ς]::P ) = {a, c} ∪ fn(range(ς)) ∪ fn(P )
fv(t[a, c, ς]::P ) = fv(range(ς)) ∪ (fv(P ) \ dom(ς))
We define the ordered domain of ς , ordom(ς) = (x1, . . . ,
xn), as the tuple containing the variables in the domain of
ς , in the same order as in the definition of ς .
We also introduce a domain-barrier construct t[a, c,
x̃]::P , which is similar to an annotated barrier except that
the ordered substitution ς is replaced with a tuple of variables
x̃ = (x1, . . . , xn) corresponding to the ordered domain of ς .
Domain-barriers occur in barriers(P ), but not in processes.
We extend function barriers to annotated barriers as follows:
barriers(t[a, c, ς]::P ) = {t[a, c, ordom(ς)]::P} ∪
barriers(P )
Hence, function barriers maps processes to multisets of
domain-barriers and integers, and domain-barriers include
the process that follows the barrier itself. In addition,
we extend fst and snd for configurations as follows:
fst(t[a, c, x̃]::P ) = t[a, c, x̃]:: fst(P ) and fst(B,E,P) =
fst(B), E, fst(P), and similarly for snd.
The operational semantics for processes with both stan-
dard and annotated barriers extends the semantics for pro-
cesses with only standard barriers, with the following rule:
B,E,P ∪ {t::P1, . . . , t::Pm, t[am+1, cm+1, ςm+1]::Pm+1,
. . . , t[an, cn, ςn]::Pn}
→ B′, E,P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1ςm+1, . . . , Pnςn}
(RED BAR’)
where 0 ≤ m ≤ n, 1 ≤ n, B = {tm, t[am+1, cm+1,
ordom(ςm+1)]::Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ordom(ςn)]::Pn} ∪ B′,
and for all t′ such that t′ ≤ t, t′ does not appear in B′, i.e.,
t′ /∈ B′ and t′[ ]:: /∈ B′. When all barriers are standard,
this rule reduces to (RED BAR).
We introduce the function channels(B) = {a | t[a, c,
x̃]::P ∈ B}∪{c | t[a, c, x̃]::P ∈ B} to recover the multiset
of names used by the domain-barriers in B. We also define
the function fn-nobc, which returns the free names exclud-
ing the channels of barriers, by fn-nobc(t[a, c, ς]::P ) =
fn(range(ς)) ∪ fn-nobc(P ) and, for all other processes,
fn-nobc(P ) is defined inductively like fn(P ). (The acronym
“nobc” stands for “no barrier channels”.) The initial con-
figuration for a closed process P with annotated barriers is
Cinit(P ) = barriers(P ), channels(barriers(P )), {P}.
We introduce the following validity condition to ensure
that channels of annotated barriers are not mixed with other
names: they are fresh names when they are introduced
by barrier annotation (Section III-B); they should remain
pairwise distinct and distinct from other names. Their scope
is global, but they are private, that is, the adversary does not
have access to them.
Definition 4 (Validity). A process P is valid if it is closed,
the elements of channels(barriers(P )) are pairwise dis-
tinct, channels(barriers(P )) ∩ fn-nobc(P ) = ∅, and for
all annotated barriers in P such that P = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q],
we have fv(Q) ⊆ dom(ς) and C[ ] does not bind a, c,
nor the names in fn(Q) above the hole.
A configuration B,E,P is valid if barriers(P) ⊆
B, channels(B) ⊆ E, all processes in P are valid,
the elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct, and
channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅.
Validity guarantees that channels used in annotated
barriers are pairwise distinct (the elements of
channels(barriers(P )) are pairwise distinct; the elements
of channels(B) are pairwise distinct), distinct from
other names (channels(barriers(P )) ∩ fn-nobc(P ) = ∅;
channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅), and free in the
processes (for all annotated barriers in P such that
P = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q], C[ ] does not bind a nor c above the
hole). These channels must be in E (channels(B) ⊆ E),
which corresponds to the intuition that they are global but
private. Furthermore, for each annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q,
we require that fv(Q) ⊆ dom(ς) and the names in fn(Q)
are not bound above the barrier, that is, they are global.
This requirement ensures that the local state of the process
t[a, c, ς]::Q is contained in the ordered substitution ς . The
process Q refers to this state using variables in dom(ς).
The next lemma allows us to show that all considered
configurations are valid.
Lemma 2. If P is a valid process, then Cinit(P ) is valid.
Validity is preserved by reduction, by application of an
adversarial context, and by application of fst and snd.
The proof of Lemma 2 and all other proofs are detailed in
the long version of this paper [37].
We refer to processes in which all barriers are annotated
as annotated processes, and processes in which all barriers
are standard as standard processes.
B. Barrier annotation
Next, we define the first step of our compiler, which
annotates barriers with additional information.
Definition 5. We define function annotate, from standard
processes to annotated processes, as follows: annotate
transforms C[t::Q] into C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′], where C[ ] is
any context without replication above the hole, a and c
are distinct fresh names, and (Q′, ς) = split(Q), where the
function split is defined below. The transformations are
performed until all barriers are annotated, in a top-down
order, so that in the transformation above, all barriers
above t::Q are already annotated and barriers inside Q
are standard.
The function split is defined by split(Q) = (Q′, ς) where
Q′ is a process and ς = (M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn) is an ordered
substitution such that terms M1, . . . ,Mn are the largest
subterms of Q that do not contain names or variables
previously bound in Q, variables x1, . . . , xn are fresh, and
process Q′ is obtained from Q by replacing each Mi with
xi, so that Q = Q′ς . Moreover, the variables x1, . . . , xn
occur in this order in Q′ when read from left to right.
Intuitively, the function split separates a process Q into its
“skeleton” Q′ (a process with variables as placeholders for
data) and associated data in the ordered substitution ς . Such
data can be swapped with another process that has the same
skeleton. The ordering of x1, . . . , xn chosen in the definition
of split guarantees that the ordering of variables in the
domain of ς is consistent among the various subprocesses.
This ordering of variables and the fact that M1, . . . ,Mn
are the largest possible subterms allows the checks in the
definition of our compiler (see definition of function swapper
in Section III-C) to succeed more often, and hence increases
opportunities for swapping.
Example 5. We have
split(c〈diff[v, v′]〉) = (x〈y〉, (c/x, diff[v, v′]/y))
split(c〈diff[v′, v]〉) = (x′〈y′〉, (c/x′, diff[v′, v]/y′))
The process c〈diff[v, v′]〉 is separated into its skeleton
Q′ = x〈y〉 and the ordered substitution ς = (c/x,
diff[v, v′]/y), which defines the values of the variables
x and y such that c〈diff[v, v′]〉 = Q′ς . The process
c〈diff[v′, v]〉 is separated similarly.
Using these results, annotate(Pex) is defined as
c〈A〉.1[a, b, (c/x, diff[v, v′]/y)]::x〈y〉 |
c〈B〉.1[a′, b′, (c/x′, diff[v′, v]/y′)]::x′〈y′〉
where a, a′, b, b′ are fresh names. That is, annotate(Pex)
is derived by annotating the two barriers in Pex. (Process
Pex is given in Example 3.)
For soundness of the transformation (Proposition 4), it is
sufficient that:
Lemma 3. If (Q′, ς) = split(Q), then Q = Q′ς , fv(Q′) =
dom(ς), and fn(Q′) = ∅.
Intuitively, when reducing the annotated barrier by
(RED BAR’), we reduce t[a, c, ς]::Q′ to Q′ς , which is equal
to Q by Lemma 3, so we recover the process Q we had
before annotation. The conditions that fv(Q′) = dom(ς) and
fn(Q′) = ∅ show that no names and variables are free in Q′
and bound above the barrier, thus substitution ς contains the
whole state of the process Q = Q′ς .
The following proposition shows that annotation does not
alter the semantics of processes:
Proposition 4. If P0 is a closed standard biprocess and P ′0 =
annotate(P0), then P ′0 is valid, fst(P
′
0) ≈ fst(P0), and
snd(P ′0) ≈ snd(P0).
Proof sketch: The main step of the proof consists in
showing that, when C[t::Pς] and C[t[a, c, ς]::P ] are valid
processes, we have
C[t::Pς] ≈ C[t[a, c, ς]::P ] (2)
This proof is performed by defining a relationR that satisfies
the conditions of Definition 1. By Lemma 3, from the
annotated biprocess P ′0, we can rebuild the initial process
P0 by replacing each occurrence of an annotated barrier
t[a, c, ς]::Q with Qς , so the same replacement also transform
fst(P ′0) into fst(P0) and snd(P
′
0) into snd(P0). By (2), this
replacement preserves the observational behaviour of the
processes.
C. Barrier elimination and swapping
Next, we define the second step of our compiler, which
translates an annotated biprocess into biprocesses without
barriers. Each annotated barrier t[a, c, ς] is eliminated by
replacing it with an output on channel a of swappable data,
followed by an input on channel c that receives swapped
data. A swapping process is added in parallel, which receives
the swappable data on channels a for all barriers t, before
sending swapped data on channels c. Therefore, all inputs on
channels a must be received before the outputs on channels
c are sent and the processes that follow the barriers can
proceed, thus the synchronisation between the barriers is
guaranteed. Moreover, the swapping process may permute
data, sending on channel c data that comes from channel a′
with a′ 6= a, thus implementing swapping. This swapping
is allowed only when the processes that follow the barriers
are identical (up to renaming of some channel names and
variables), so that swapping preserves the observational be-
haviour of the processes. We detail this construction below.
1) Barrier elimination: First, we eliminate barriers.
Definition 6. The function bar-elim removes annotated
barriers, by transforming each annotated barrier t[a,
c, (M1/z1, . . . ,Mn/zn)]::Q into a〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.c(z).
let z1 = π1,n(z) in · · · let zn = πn,n(z) in Q, where
z is a fresh variable.
The definition of function bar-elim ensures that, if the
message (M1, . . . ,Mn) on the private channel a is simply
forwarded to the private channel c, then the process de-
rived by application of bar-elim binds zi to Mi for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, like the annotated barrier, so the original
process and the process derived by application bar-elim are
observationally equivalent. Intuitively, the private channel
communication provides an opportunity to swap data.
Example 6. Using the results of Example 5,
eliminating barriers from annotate(Pex) results in
bar-elim(annotate(Pex)) = Pcomp | P ′comp, where
Pcomp , c〈A〉.a〈(c, diff[v, v′])〉.b(z).
let x = π1,2(z) in let y = π2,2(z) in x〈y〉
P ′comp , c〈B〉.a′〈(c, diff[v′, v])〉.b′(z′).
let x′ = π1,2(z′) in let y′ = π2,2(z′) in x′〈y′〉
for some fresh variables z and z′.
2) Swapping: Next, we define swapping strategies.
Definition 7. The function swapper is defined as follows:
swapper(∅) = {0}
swapper(B) ={
a1(x1) . · · · . an(xn).
c1〈diff[x1, xf(1)]〉 . · · · . cn〈diff[xn, xf(n)]〉.R∣∣B = {t[a1, c1, z̃1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z̃n]::Qn} ∪B′
where, for all t′[a, c, z̃]::Q ∈ B′, we have t′ > t;
f is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such that,
for all 1 ≤ l ≤ n, we have Ql/z̃l =ch Qf(l)/z̃f(l);
R ∈ swapper(B′);
and x1, . . . , xn are fresh variables
}
if B 6= ∅
where =ch is defined as follows:
• Q =ch Q
′ means that Q equals Q′ modulo renaming
of channels of annotated barriers and
• Q/z̃ =ch Q
′/z̃′ means that z̃ = (z1, . . . , zk)
and z̃′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′
k) for some integer k, and
Q{y1/z1, . . . , yk/zk} =ch Q′{y1/z′1, . . . , yk/z′k} for
some fresh variables y1, . . . , yk.
The function swapper builds a set of processes from
a multiset of domain-barriers B as follows. We identify
integer t ∈ N and domain-barriers t[a1, c1, z̃1]::Q1, . . . ,
t[an, cn, z̃n]::Qn in B such that no other barriers with
t′ ≤ t appear in B, so that these barriers are reduced
before other barriers in B. Among these barriers, we con-
sider barriers t[ai, ci, z̃i]::Qi and t[aj , cj , z̃j ]::Qj such that
Qi/z̃i =ch Qj/z̃j , that is, the processes Qi and Qj are equal
modulo renaming of channels of annotated barriers, after
renaming the variables in z̃i and z̃j to the same variables,
and we allow swapping data between such barriers using
the permutation f . We then construct a set of processes
which enable swapping, by receiving data to be swapped
on channels a1, . . . , an, and sending it back on channels
c1, . . . , cn, in the same order in the first component of
diff and permuted by f in the second component of diff.
The function swapper does not specify an ordering on the
pairs of channels (a1, c1), . . . , (an, cn), since any ordering
is correct.
Example 7. We have barriers(annotate(Pex)) =
{1[a, b, (x, y)]::x〈y〉, 1[a′, b′, (x′, y′)]::x′〈y′〉}. Moreover,
we trivially have x〈y〉/(x, y) =ch x〈y〉/(x, y) and
x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′) =ch x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′), because Q/z̃ =ch Q/z̃
for all Q and z̃. We also have x〈y〉/(x, y) =ch
x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′), because
x〈y〉{x′′/x, y′′/y} = x′′〈y′′〉 = x′〈y′〉{x′′/x′, y′′/y′}
It follows that swapper(barriers(annotate(Pex))) =
{Psame, Pswap}, where
Psame , a(z).a
′(z′).b〈diff[z, z]〉.b′〈diff[z′, z′]〉
Pswap , a(z).a
′(z′).b〈diff[z, z′]〉.b′〈diff[z′, z]〉
for some fresh variables z and z′. (Note that diff[z, z]
could be simplified into z.) This set considers the two
possible swapping strategies: the strategy that does not
swap any data and the strategy that swaps data between
the two processes at the barrier.
3) Combining barrier elimination and swapping: Finally,
we derive a set of processes by parallel composition of
the process output by bar-elim and the processes output by
swapper, under the scope of name restrictions on the fresh
channels introduced by annotate.
elim-and-swap(P ) ={
ν ã.(bar-elim(P ) | R) where B = barriers(P ),
{ã} = channels(B), and R ∈ swapper(B)
}
Intuitively, function elim-and-swap encodes barrier syn-
chronisation and swapping using private channel commu-
nication, thereby preserving the observational behaviour of
processes.
Example 8. Using the results of Examples 6 & 7, applying
elim-and-swap to the process annotate(Pex) generates two
processes
P1 , ν a, a
′, b, b′.(Pcomp | P ′comp | Psame)
P2 , ν a, a
′, b, b′.(Pcomp | P ′comp | Pswap)
In the process P1, no data is swapped, so it behaves
exactly like Pex: (c, diff[v, v′]) is sent on a, sent back
on b by Psame as diff[(c, diff[v, v′]), (c, diff[v, v′])] which
simplifies into (c, diff[v, v′]), and after evaluating the
projections, Pcomp reduces into c〈diff[v, v′]〉, which is the
output present in the process Pex. Similarly, P ′comp reduces
into c〈diff[v′, v]〉, present in Pex.
By contrast, in process P2, data is swapped: (c, diff[v, v′])
is sent on a and (c, diff[v′, v]) is sent on a′, and Pswap
sends back diff[(c, diff[v, v′]), (c, diff[v′, v])] on b. The
first component of this term is (c, v) (obtained by taking
the first component of each diff), and similarly its second
component is also (c, v), so this term simplifies into
(c, v). After evaluating the projections, Pcomp reduces
into c〈v〉. Similarly, P ′comp reduces into c〈v′〉. Hence P2
behaves like c〈A〉.1:: c〈v〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈v′〉. In particular,
P2 outputs A and B before barrier synchronisation and v
and v′ after synchronisation just like Pex. But P2 satisfies
diff-equivalence while Pex does not.
The next proposition formalises this preservation of ob-
servable behaviour.
Proposition 5. Let P be a valid, annotated biprocess. If P ′ ∈
elim-and-swap(P ), then fst(P ) ≈ fst(P ′) and snd(P ) ≈
snd(P ′).
Proof sketch: This proof is performed by defining a
relation R that satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. The
proof is fairly long and delicate, and relies on preliminary
lemmas that show that barrier elimination commutes with
renaming and substitution, and that it preserves reduction
when barriers are not reduced.
D. Our compiler
We combine the annotation (Section III-B) and removal
of barrier (Section III-C) steps to define our compiler as
compiler(P ) = elim-and-swap(annotate(P ))
We have implemented the compiler in ProVerif, which is
available from: http://proverif.inria.fr/.
By combining Propositions 4 and 5, we immediately
obtain:
Proposition 6. Let P be a closed standard biprocess. If
P ′ ∈ compiler(P ), then fst(P ) ≈ fst(P ′) and snd(P ) ≈
snd(P ′).
This proposition shows that compilation preserves the ob-
servational behaviour of processes. The following theorem
is an immediate consequence of this proposition:
Theorem 7. Let P be a closed biprocess. If a biprocess in
compiler(P ) satisfies observational equivalence, then P
satisfies observational equivalence.
This theorem allows us to prove observational equivalence
using swapping: we prove that a biprocess in compiler(P )
satisfies observational equivalence using ProVerif (by The-
orem 1), and conclude that P satisfies observational equiv-
alence as well. For instance, ProVerif can show that the
process P2 ∈ compiler(Pex) of Example 8 satisfies obser-
vational equivalence, thus Pex satisfies observational equiv-
alence too.
Our compiler could be implemented in other tools
that prove diff-equivalence (e.g., Maude-NPA [23] and
Tamarin [24]), by adapting the input language. It could
also be applied to other methods of proving equivalence.
However, it may be less useful in these cases, since it might
not permit the proof of more equivalences in such cases.
E. Extensions
1) Replicated barriers: While our calculus does not allow
barriers under replication, we can still prove equivalence
with barriers under bounded replication, for any bound. We
define bounded replication by !nP , P | · · · | P with n
copies of the process P . We have the following results:
Proposition 8. Let C[!Q] be a closed standard biprocess,
such that the context C[ ] does not contain any bar-
rier above the hole. If a biprocess in compiler(C[!Q])
satisfies diff-equivalence, then for all n, a biprocess in
compiler(C[!nQ]) satisfies diff-equivalence.
Proposition 8 shows that, if our approach proves equiva-
lence with unbounded replication, then it also proves equiv-
alence with bounded replication.
Proposition 9. Let C[Q] be a closed standard biprocess,
such that the context C[ ] does not contain any replication
above the hole. If a biprocess in compiler(C[Q]) satisfies
diff-equivalence, then a biprocess in compiler(C[t::Q])
satisfies diff-equivalence.
Proposition 9 shows that, if our approach proves equiv-
alence after removing a barrier, then it also proves equiva-
lence with the barrier. By combining these two results, we
obtain:
Corollary 10. Let Qnobar be obtained from Q by removing
all barriers. Let C[ ] be a context that does not contain
any replication or barrier above the hole. If a biprocess
in compiler(C[!Qnobar]) satisfies diff-equivalence, then for
all n, process C[!nQ] satisfies observational equivalence.
Hence, we can apply our compiler to prove observational
equivalence for biprocesses with bounded replication, for
any value of the bound. In the case of election schemes,
this result allows us to prove privacy for an unbounded
number of voters, for instance in the protocol by Lee et
al. (Section IV-B).
2) Local synchronisation: Our results could be extended
to systems in which several groups of participants synchro-
nise locally inside each group, but do not synchronise with
other groups. In this case, we would need several swapping
processes similar to those generated by swapper, one for
each group.
3) Trace properties: ProVerif also supports the proof of
trace properties (reachability and correspondence properties
of the form “if some event has been executed, then some
other events must have been executed”, which serve for for-
malising authentication) [47]. Our implementation extends
this support to processes with barriers, by compiling them
to processes without barriers, and applying ProVerif to the
compiled processes. In this case, swapping does not help, so
our compiler does not swap. We do not detail the proof of
trace properties with barriers further, since it is easier and
less important than observational equivalence.
IV. PRIVACY IN ELECTIONS
Elections enable voters to choose representatives. Choices
should be made freely, and this has led to the emergence of
ballot secrecy as a de facto standard privacy requirement of
elections. Stronger formulations of privacy, such as receipt-
freeness, are also possible.
• Ballot secrecy: a voter’s vote is not revealed to anyone.
• Receipt-freeness: a voter cannot prove how she voted.
We demonstrate the suitability of our approach for analysing
privacy requirements of election schemes by Fujioka,
Okamoto & Ohta, commonly referred to as FOO, and Lee
et al., along with some of its variants. Our ProVerif scripts
are included in ProVerif’s documentation package (http:
//proverif.inria.fr/). The runtime of these scripts (including
compilation of barriers and proof of diff-equivalence by
ProVerif) ranges from 0.14 seconds for FOO to 90 seconds
for the most complex variant of the Lee et al. protocol, on
an Intel Xeon 3.6 GHz under Linux.
A. Case study: FOO
1) Cryptographic primitives: FOO uses commitments
and blind signatures. We model commitment with a binary
constructor commit, and the corresponding destructor open
for opening the commitment, with the following rewrite rule:
open(xk, commit(xk, xplain))→ xplain
Using constructors sign, blind, and pk, we model blind
signatures as follows: sign(xsk, xmsg) is the signature of
message xmsg under secret key xsk, blind(xk, xmsg) is the
blinding of message xmsg with coins xk, and pk(xsk) is
the public key corresponding to the secret key xsk. We also
use three destructors: checksign to verify signatures, getmsg
to model that an adversary may recover the message from
the signature, even without the public key, and unblind for
unblinding, defined by the following rewrite rules:
checksign(pk(xsk), sign(xsk, xmsg))→ xmsg
getmsg(sign(xsk, xmsg))→ xmsg
unblind(xk, sign(xsk, blind(xk, xmsg)))→ sign(xsk, xmsg)
unblind(xk, blind(xk, xplain))→ xplain
With blind signatures, a signer may sign a blinded message
without learning the plaintext message, and the signature on
the plaintext message can be recovered by unblinding, as
shown by the third rewrite rule.
2) Protocol description: The protocol uses two author-
ities, a registrar and a tallier, and it is divided into four
phases, setup, preparation, commitment, and tallying. The
setup phase proceeds as follows.
1) The registrar creates a signing key pair skR and
pk(skR), and publishes the public part pk(skR). In
addition, each voter is assumed to have a signing key
pair skV and pk(skV ), where the public part pk(skV )
has been published.
The preparation phase then proceeds as follows.
2) The voter chooses coins k and k′, computes the
commitment to her vote M = commit(k, v) and the
signed blinded commitment sign(skV , blind(k′,M)),
and sends the signature, paired with her public key, to
the registrar.
3) The registrar checks that the signature belongs to an
eligible voter and returns the blinded commitment
signed by the registrar sign(skR, blind(k′,M)).
4) The voter verifies the registrar’s signature and unblinds
the message to recover M̂ = sign(skR,M), that is, her
commitment signed by the registrar.
After a deadline, the protocol enters the commitment phase.
5) The voter posts her ballot M̂ to the bulletin board.
Similarly, the tallying phase begins after a deadline.
6) The tallier checks validity of all signatures on the
bulletin board and prepends an identifier ` to each
valid entry.
7) The voter checks the bulletin board for her entry, the
pair `, M̂ , and appends the commitment factor k.
8) Finally, using k, the tallier opens all of the ballots and
announces the election outcome.
The distinction between phases is essential to uphold the
protocol’s security properties. In particular, voters must
synchronise before the commitment phase to ensure ballot
secrecy (observe that without synchronisation, traffic anal-
ysis may allow the voter’s signature to be linked with the
commitment to her vote – this is trivially possible when
a voter completes the commitment phase before any other
voter starts the preparation phase, for instance – which can
then be linked to her vote) and before the tallying phase
to avoid publishing partial results, that is, to ensure fairness
(see Cortier & Smyth [48] for further discussion on fairness).
3) Model: To analyse ballot secrecy, it suffices to model
the participants that must be honest (i.e., must follow the
protocol description) for ballot secrecy to be satisfied. All
the remaining participants are controlled by the adversary.
The FOO protocol assures ballot secrecy in the presence of
dishonest authorities if the voter is honest. Hence, it suffices
to model the voter’s part of FOO as a process.
Definition 8. The process Pfoo(xsk, xvote) modelling a voter
in FOO, with signing key xsk and vote xvote, is defined
as follows
ν k.ν k′. % Step 2
let M = commit(k, xvote) in
let M ′ = blind(k′,M) in
c〈(pk(xsk), sign(xsk,M ′))〉.
c(y). % Step 4
let y′ = checksign(pk(skR), y) in
if y′ =M ′ then
let M̂ = unblind(k′, y) in
1:: c〈M̂〉. % Step 5
2:: c(z).let z2 = π2,2(z) in % Step 7
if z2 = M̂ then c〈(z, k)〉
The process Pfoo(sk1, v1) | · · · | Pfoo(skn, vn) models an
election with n voters casting votes v1, . . . , vn and encodes
the separation of phases using barriers.
4) Analysis: ballot secrecy: Based upon [2], [49] and
as outlined in Section I, we formalise ballot secrecy for
two voters A and B with the assertion that an adversary
cannot distinguish between a situation in which voter A
votes for candidate v and voter B votes for candidate v′,
from another one in which A votes v′ and B votes v. We
use the biprocess Pfoo(skA, diff[v, v′]) to model A and the
biprocess Pfoo(skB , diff[v′, v]) to model B, and formally
express ballot secrecy as an equivalence which can be
checked using Theorem 7. Voters’ keys are modelled as
free names, since ballot secrecy can be achieved without
confidentiality of these keys. (Voters’ keys must be secret
for other properties.)
Definition 9 (Ballot secrecy). FOO preserves ballot se-
crecy if the biprocess Qfoo , Pfoo(skA, diff[v, v′]) |
Pfoo(skB , diff[v
′, v]) satisfies observational equivalence.
To provide further insight into how our compiler works,
let us consider how to informally prove this equivalence:
that fst(Qfoo) is indistinguishable from snd(Qfoo). Before
the first barrier, A outputs
(pk(skA), sign(skA, blind(k
′
a, commit(ka, v))))
in fst(Qfoo) and
(pk(skA), sign(skA, blind(k
′
a, commit(ka, v
′))))
in snd(Qfoo), where the name k′a remains secret. By the
equational theory for blinding, N can only be recovered
from blind(M,N) if M is known, so these two messages are
indistinguishable. The situation is similar for B. Therefore,
before the first barrier, A moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked
by A moves in snd(Qfoo) and B moves in fst(Qfoo) are
mimicked by B moves in snd(Qfoo).
Let us define sc(k, v) , sign(skR, commit(k, v)). After
the first barrier, A outputs
sc(ka, v) and ((`1, sc(ka, v)), ka) in fst(Qfoo)
sc(ka, v
′) and ((`1, sc(ka, v′)), ka) in snd(Qfoo)
where `1 is chosen by the adversary. It follows that A reveals
her vote v in fst(Qfoo) and her vote v′ in snd(Qfoo), so these
messages are distinguishable. However, B outputs
sc(kb, v
′) and ((`2, sc(kb, v′)) kb) in fst(Qfoo)
sc(kb, v) and ((`2, sc(kb, v)) kb) in snd(Qfoo)
where `2 is similarly chosen by the adversary. Hence,
B’s messages in snd(Qfoo) are indistinguishable from A’s
messages in fst(Qfoo). Therefore, after the first barrier, A
moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by B moves in snd(Qfoo)
and symmetrically, B moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by
A moves in snd(Qfoo), that is, the roles are swapped at the
first barrier. Our compiler encodes the swapping, hence we
can show that FOO satisfies ballot secrecy using Theorem 7.
Moreover, ProVerif proves this result automatically. This
proof is done for two honest voters, but it generalises
immediately to any number of possibly dishonest voters,
since other voters can be part of the adversary.
Showing that FOO satisfies ballot secrecy is not new:
Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [2], [49] present a manual proof
of ballot secrecy, Chothia et al. [50] provide an automated
analysis in the presence of a passive adversary, and Delaune,
Ryan & Smyth [38], Klus, Smyth & Ryan [41], and Chadha,
Ciobâcă & Kremer [19], [20] provide automated analysis
in the presence of an active adversary. Nevertheless, our
analysis is useful to demonstrate our approach.
FOO does not satisfy receipt-freeness, because each voter
knows the coins used to construct their ballot and these coins
can be used as a witness to demonstrate how they voted. In
an effort to achieve receipt-freeness, the protocol by Lee et
al. [51] uses a hardware device to introduce coins into the
ballot that the voter does not know.
B. Case study: Lee et al.
1) Protocol description: The protocol uses a registrar and
some talliers, and it is divided into three phases, setup,
voting, and tallying. For simplicity, we assume there is a
single tallier. The setup phase proceeds as follows.
1) The tallier generates a key pair and publishes the
public key.
2) Each voter is assumed to have a signing key pair
and an offline tamper-resistant hardware device. The
registrar is assumed to know the public keys of voters
and devices. The registrar publishes those public keys.
The voting phase proceeds as follows.
3) The voter encrypts her vote and inputs the resulting
ciphertext into her tamper-resistant hardware device.
4) The hardware device re-encrypts the voter’s cipher-
text, signs the re-encryption, computes a Designated
Verifier Proof that the re-encryption was performed
correctly, and outputs these values to the voter.
5) If the signature and proof are valid, then the voter
outputs the re-encryption and signature, along with her
signature of these elements.
The hardware device re-encrypts the voter’s encrypted
choice to ensure that the voter’s coins cannot be used as
a witness demonstrating how the voter voted. Moreover, the
device is offline, thus communication between the voter and
the device is assumed to be untappable, hence, the only
meaningful relation between the ciphertexts input and output
by the hardware device is due to the Designated Verifier
Proof, which can only be verified by the voter.
Finally, the tallying phase proceeds as follows.
6) Valid ballots (that is, ciphertexts associated with valid
signatures) are input to a mixnet and the mixnet’s out-
put is published. We model the mixnet as a collection
of parallel processes that each input a ballot, verify the
signatures, synchronise with the other processes, and
finally output the ciphertext on an anonymous channel.
7) The tallier decrypts each ciphertext and announces the
election outcome.
2) Analysis: ballot secrecy: In this protocol, the au-
thorities and hardware devices must be honest for ballot
secrecy to be satisfied, so we need to explicitly model them.
Therefore, building upon (1), we formalise ballot secrecy by
the equivalence
C[V (A, v) | V (B, v′)] ≈ C[V (A, v′) | V (B, v)] (3)
where the process V (A, v) models a voter with identity
A (including its private key, its device public key, and its
private channel to the device) voting v, and the context
C models all other participants: authorities and hardware
devices. (Other voters are included in C for privacy results
concerning more than two voters.) With two voters, we prove
ballot secrecy by swapping data at the synchronisation in
the mixnet. With an unbounded number of honest voters,
we prove ballot secrecy using Corollary 10 to model an
unbounded number of voters by a replicated process. As far
as we know, this is the first proof of this result.
With an additional dishonest voter, the proof of ballot
secrecy fails. This failure does not come from a limitation
of our approach, but from a ballot copying attack, already
mentioned in the original paper [51, Section 6] and for-
malised in [52]: the dishonest voter can copy A’s vote,
as follows. The adversary observes A’s encrypted vote on
the bulletin board (since it is accompanied by the voter’s
signature), inputs the ciphertext to the adversary’s tamper-
resistant hardware device, uses the output to derive a related
ballot, and derives A’s vote from the election outcome,
which contains two copies of A’s vote.
3) Analysis: receipt-freeness: Following [2], receipt-
freeness can be formalised as follows: there exists a process
V ′ such that
V ′\chc ≈ V (A, v) (4)
C[V (A, v′)chc | V (B, v)] ≈ C[V ′ | V (B, v′)] (5)
where the context C[ ] appears in (3), chc is a public
channel, V ′\chc = ν chc.(V |!chc(x)), which is intuitively
equivalent to removing all outputs on channel chc from
V ′, and V (A, v′)chc is obtained by modifying V (A, v′) as
follows: we output on channel chc the private key of A,
its device public key, all restricted names created by V ,
and messages received by V . Intuitively, the voter A tries
to prove to the adversary how she voted, by giving the
adversary all its secrets, as modelled by V (A, v′)chc . The
process V ′ simulates a voter A that votes v, as shown by (4),
but outputs messages on channel chc that aim to make the
adversary think that it voted v′. The equivalence (5) shows
that the adversary cannot distinguish voter A voting v′ and
trying to prove it to the adversary and voter B voting v,
from V ′ and voter B voting v′, so V ′ successfully votes v
and deceives the adversary in thinking that it voted v′.
In the case of the Lee et al. protocol, V ′ is derived from
V (A, v)chc by outputting on chc a fake Designated Verifier
Proof that simulates a proof of re-encryption of a vote for
v′, instead of the Designated Verifier Proof that it receives
from the device. Intuitively, the adversary cannot distinguish
a fake proof from a real one, because only the voter can
verify the proof.
The equivalence (4) holds by construction of V ′, because
after removing outputs on chc, V ′ is exactly the same as
V (A, v). We prove (5) using our approach, for an unbounded
number of honest voters. Hence, this protocol satisfies
receipt-freeness for an unbounded number of honest voters.
As far as we know, this is the first proof of this result.
Obviously, receipt-freeness does not hold with dishonest
voters, because it implies ballot secrecy.
4) Variant by Dreier, Lafourcade & Lakhnech: Dreier,
Lafourcade & Lakhnech [52] introduced a variant of this
protocol in which, in step 3, the voter additionally signs the
ciphertext containing her vote, and in step 4, the hardware
device verifies this signature. We have also analysed this
variant using our approach. It is sufficiently similar to the
original protocol that we obtain the same results for both.
5) Variant by Delaune, Kremer, & Ryan:
Protocol description: Delaune, Kremer, & Ryan [2] in-
troduced a variant of this protocol in which the hardware
devices are replaced with a single administrator, and the
voting phase becomes:
3) The voter encrypts her vote, signs the ciphertext, and
sends the ciphertext and signature to the administrator
on a private channel.
4) The administrator verifies the signature, re-encrypts
the voter’s ciphertext, signs the re-encryption, com-
putes a Designated Verifier Proof of re-encryption, and
outputs these values to the voter.
5) If the signature and proof are valid, then the voter out-
puts her ballot, consisting of the signed re-encryption
(via an anonymous channel).
The mixnet is replaced with the anonymous channel, and
the tallying phase becomes:
6) The collector checks that the ballots are pairwise
distinct, checks the administrator’s signature on each
of the ballots, and, if valid, decrypts the ballots and
announces the election outcome.
Analysis: ballot secrecy: We have shown that this variant
preserves ballot secrecy, with two honest voters, using our
approach. In this proof, all keys are public and the collector
is not trusted, so it is included in the adversary. Since the
keys are public, any number of dishonest voters can also be
included in the adversary, so the proof with two honest voters
suffices to imply ballot secrecy for any number of possibly
dishonest voters. Hence, this variant avoids the ballot copy-
ing attack and satisfies a stronger ballot secrecy property
than the original protocol. Thus, we automate the proof made
manually in [2]. For this variant, the swapping occurs at the
beginning of the voting process, so we can actually prove
the equivalence by proving diff-equivalence after applying
the general property that C[P | Q] ≈ C[Q | P ], much like
for Example 1. Furthermore, an extension of ProVerif [53]
takes advantage of this property to merge processes into
biprocesses in order to prove observational equivalence. The
approach outlined in that paper also succeeds in proving bal-
lot secrecy for this variant. It takes 13 minutes 22 seconds,
while our implementation with swapping takes 34 seconds. It
spends most of the time computing the merged biprocesses;
this is the reason why it is slower.
Analysis: receipt-freeness: We prove receipt-freeness for
two honest voters. The administrator and voter keys do
need to be secret, and all authorities need to be explicitly
modelled. The process V ′ is built similarly to the one for the
original protocol by Lee et al. Equivalence (4) again holds
by construction of V ′. To prove (5), much like in [2], we
model the collector as parallel processes that each input one
ballot, check the signature, decrypt, synchronise together,
and output the decrypted vote:
c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in
let v = dec(skC , ev) in 2:: c〈v〉
There are as many such processes as there are voters, two
in our case. However, such a collector does not check that
the ballots are pairwise distinct: each of the two parallel
processes has access to a single ballot, so each process in-
dividually cannot check that the two ballots are distinct. We
implemented this necessary check by manually modifying
the code generated by our compiler, by adding a check that
the ballots are distinct in the process that swaps data. An
excerpt of the obtained code follows:
(c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in
let v = dec(skC , ev) in a1〈(b, v)〉; c1(v′); c〈v′〉)
| (c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in
let v = dec(skC , ev) in a2〈(b, v)〉; c2(v′); c〈v′〉)
| (a1((b1, v1)); a2((b2, v2));
(∗) if b1 = b2 then 0 else
c1〈diff[v1, v2]〉; c2〈diff[v2, v1]〉)
This code shows the two collectors and the process that
swaps data. We use a((b, v)) as an abbreviation for a(x);
let b = π1,2(x) in let v = π2,2(x) in. The ballots are sent
on channels a1 and a2 in addition to the decrypted votes, and
we check that the two ballots are distinct at line (∗). With
this code, ProVerif proves the diff-equivalence, so we have
shown receipt-freeness for two honest voters. This proof is
difficult to generalise to more voters in ProVerif, because in
this case the collector should swap two ballots among the
ones it has received (the two coming to the voters that swap
their voters), but it has no means to detect which ones.
C. Other examples
The idea of swapping for proving equivalences has been
applied by Dahl, Delaune & Steel [3] to prove privacy in a
vehicular ad-hoc network [54]. They manually encode swap-
ping based upon the informal idea of [38]. We have repeated
their analysis using our approach. Thus, we automate the
encoding of swapping in [3], and obtain stronger confidence
in the results thanks to our soundness proof.
Backes, Hriţcu & Maffei [29] also applied the idea of
swapping, together with other encoding tricks, to prove a
privacy notion stronger than receipt-freeness, namely co-
ercion resistance, of the protocol by Juels, Catalano &
Jakobsson [55]. We did not try to repeat their analysis using
our approach.
V. CONCLUSION
We extend the applied pi calculus to include barrier syn-
chronisation and define a compiler to the calculus without
barriers. Our compiler enables swapping data between pro-
cesses at barriers, which simplifies proofs of observational
equivalence. We have proven the soundness of our compiler
and have implemented it in ProVerif, thereby extending the
class of equivalences that can be automatically verified. The
applicability of the results is demonstrated by analysing
ballot secrecy and receipt-freeness in election schemes, as
well as privacy in a vehicular ad-hoc network. The idea of
swapping data at barriers was introduced in [38], without
proving its soundness, and similar ideas have been used
by several researchers [3], [29], so we believe that it is
important to provide a strong theoretical foundation to this
technique.
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[14] H. Hüttel, “Deciding Framed Bisimilarity,” Electronic Notes in Theo-
retical Computer Science, vol. 68, no. 6, pp. 1–20, 2003, special issue
Infinity’02: 4th International Workshop on Verification of Infinite-
State Systems.
[15] L. Durante, R. Sisto, and A. Valenzano, “Automatic Testing Equiva-
lence Verification of Spi Calculus Specifications,” ACM Transactions
on Software Engineering and Methodology, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 222–
284, 2003.
[16] V. Cortier and S. Delaune, “A method for proving observational
equivalence,” in CSF’09: 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Symposium. IEEE Computer Society, 2009, pp. 266–276.
[17] A. Tiu and J. Dawson, “Automating open bisimulation checking
for the spi calculus,” in CSF’10: 23rd IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium. IEEE, 2010, pp. 307–321.
[18] V. Cheval, H. Comon-Lundh, and S. Delaune, “Trace equivalence
decision: Negative tests and non-determinism,” in CCS’11: 18th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM Press,
2011, pp. 321–330.
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